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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that text comprehension can be viewed as 
the process of constructing mental models from texts. We suggest 
that the construction of mental models involves the use of local 
text information, global text structures, and the reader's 
general knowledge of the world. We analyze the literature on 
children's understanding of spoken discourse and conclude that 
young children are capable of forming mental models from texts, 
but that their overall level of comprehension may be limited by 
factors such as limited general knowledge, inexperience in 
constructing certain types of mental models, unfamiliarity with 
particular global text structures, difficulty in understanding 
anaphoric expressions, and constraints on memory. We contrast 
the comprehension of spoken discourse with the comprehension of 
written text. We conclude that written text taps a wider range 
of general knowledge, shows different forms of discourse 
organization, uses different anaphoric devices, and provides less 
contextual support than spoken discourse. Finally we discuss the 
implications of this analysis for reading in terms of the 
transfer of oral comprehension skills to the understanding of 
written text. We suggest that the transfer should be relatively 
easy for narrative texts but more difficult for expository texts. 
/ 
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Discourse Structure and Mental Models 
This paper focuses on the discourse features of text and 
their influence on comprehension and learning to read. Our point 
of view is that discourse comprehension involves the construction 
by readers or listeners of mental models synthesized from the 
information in the text and their general knowledge. Within this 
framework, we examine five aspects of discourse comprehension, 
first in the context of young children's ability to understand 
spoken discourse, and then from the perspective of differences 
between speech and writing. These five aspects include the use 
of knowledge, the kinds of mental models that underlie different 
types of discourse, the global organization of texts, the use of 
discourse cues in the construction of mental models, and the 
integration of information into a mental model. We conclude by 
exploring some potential implications of this approach for the 
development of reading skill. 
Mental Models and Discourse Comprehension 
Mental models. Watching a movie based on a familiar novel 
often brings on the feeling that something is awry. The rooms 
are too large, the furniture too new, the protagonist too 
handsome. Such a feeling presumably grows out of the contrast 
between what actually unfolds on the screen and expectations 
built on earlier imaginings about the people, places, and events 
of the story. We assume that these imaginings reflect a 
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fundamental part of discourse comprehension, which involves the 
construction of a mental model. Mental models are mental 
representations of particular states of affairs, such as events 
or places or someone's wishes. In discourse comprehension, 
listeners and readers try to construct mental models that embody 
the content of the text (Collins, Brown, & Larkin, 1980; Johnson-
Laird, 1980, 1983). 
For the listener or reader to construct a mental model, the 
sentences in a discourse should be coherent and describe a 
plausible set of ideas or sequence of events (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). Coherence depends in part on coreference among the 
sentences of the text: For the comprehender to construct a 
single integrated mental model, every sentence must directly or 
indirectly refer to something mentioned in another sentence. 
Plausibility requires the discourse to be interpretable within a 
unified framework consistent with the comprehender's knowledge of 
time, space, causation, and human intention. It is possible to 
compose a passage that is coherent but not interpretable within a 
unified framework; for example: 
Robbie owned a bike. It was made in Great Britain. Great 
Britain is an island. On the island are several monolithic 
structures. These structures may have been early 
astronomical observatories. Modern observatories use 
telescopes. 
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However, coherence and plausibility are ordinarily associated in 
natural discourse. 
This analysis yields a reasonable straightforward approach 
to the process of discourse comprehension. To understand a 
coherent, plausible discourse is to construct a mental model of 
the events, descriptions, or arguments that underlie it, 
integrating one's general knowledge and the information in the 
text into a unified representation. 
Knowledge. Even the very young comprehender brings an 
enormous amount of real-world knowledge to the task of language 
understanding, knowledge that we assume is represented in the 
form of generic structures called schemas (Brewer & Nakamura, 
1984; Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1980). To the degree that a 
segment of discourse makes contact with the comprehender's 
schema-based knowledge, the information can be used to construct 
a mental model that is much richer than the information explicit 
in the text. Even linguistically impoverished prose, such as 
First bike ride—man—boy—push—wobble—peddle—fall—grin can 
be readily interpreted by most adults, using knowledge of first 
bike rides to construct a tentative model that goes far beyond 
the text. Schema-based knowledge thus powerfully influences the 
representation that is developed as spoken or written discourse 
is understood. 
A classic demonstration of the influence of schema-based 
knowledge on comprehension supports the claim that adults' 
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interpretation of text yields an integrated representation that 
includes more than the presented information. Bransford, 
Barclay, and Franks, (1972) showed that subjects who heard such a 
sentence as Two turtles rested on a_ floating log, and a_ fish swam 
beneath it often thought they had heard the test sentence Two 
turtles rested on ji floating log, and a_ fish swam beneath them. 
They apparently inferred that the fish swam beneath the turtles 
as well as the log, although this was not directly stated. When 
the original sentence was Two turtles rested beside a_ floating 
log, and a fish swam beneath it, subjects much less often claimed 
to have heard the test sentence (see also Garnham, 1981). These 
patterns of false recognition can be explained by the assumption 
that listeners constructed mental models of the state of affairs 
that the text was intended to convey. 
Discourse information. It is obvious that mental models 
are not completely inferential. The other major source of 
information used in constructing them is the explicit language of 
the discourse. This language details the setting, identifies 
characters, describes specific events, or lays out the ideas and 
arguments that the author wishes to make explicit. Some of the 
interactions between a developing model and the language of a 
text are illustrated in the following narrative about a first 
bike ride: 
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One cloudy October day, Fred Bartlett took his son Robert 
out for his first bike ride. Robbie was very excited and 
said, "I sure am glad I got this Raleigh for my birthday." 
His father smiled and checked to see if the football field 
was clear. He picked Robbie up and put him on the new two-
wheeler. His son was trying to be brave and had a very 
serious look on his face. Mr. Bartlett gave him a push, and 
the secretly terrified child began to peddle. He wobbled 
briefly and then went straight about fifty feet before he 
fell over. His father ran over and found a little boy lying 
on the grass with a big grin on his face. 
Consider the differences between the mental models that a typical 
adult might produce for the previous minimal text and this 
extended narrative. Because little specific information is given 
in the minimal text, most of the model must be generated from 
schema-based knowledge, and seems likely to include the 
information that the bike is a bicycle (not a motorcycle), that 
the older person instructs the younger, that the older person is 
the father of the younger, and that the younger person falls off 
the bike. In these instances, the schema-driven inferences are 
confirmed by the language of the full text. However, a mental 
model for the minimal text might also place the ride on a 
sidewalk or street on a warm sunny day. These inferences are not 
supported by the extended narrative. The information that the 
ride occurred on a football field on a cloudy October day, which 
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should be represented in the mental model generated from the 
passage, comes from the text. 
Certain linguistic features serve as cues for specific types 
of interactions between the information in the text and the 
developing mental mode] of the comprehender. In the preceding 
narrative, two individuals and a bike are mentioned frequently, 
but the expressions denoting them vary. ' The boy is referred to 
as his son Robert, Robbie, I_, him, his son, the secretly 
terri fied child, he, and little boy, and his father is referred 
to as Fred Bartlett, his father, he, and Mr. Bartlett. The 
reader must correctly interpret each of these expressions, 
determining which person is intended. Part of the linguistic 
information can be used to figure out whether an expression 
denotes something that is already part of the mental model (given 
information) or something that is to be added (new information). 
Reference to given information is often marked by pronouns (1^ , 
him, he) or other anaphoric devices, such as definite noun 
phrases like the secretly terrified child. To understand the 
text adequately, the appropriate information must be located in 
the mental model and modified by adding the new material to the 
representation (Clark & Haviland, 1977). New information is more 
often conveyed in full noun phrases than in pronouns, and those 
noun phrases may be marked with an indefinite determiner (for 
example, a push, a big grin) (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). In the 
last sentence of the passage, a_ is used inappropriately to refer 
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to information already in the reader's mental model (a little 
boy); such inappropriate marking seems to disrupt reading (Irwin, 
Bock, & Stanovich, 1982) and the integration of information into 
a unified representation (deVilliers, 1974). 
These are some of the basic features of mental models and 
their construction. We turn now to the issue of children's 
ability to create mental models to represent the information in 
spoken discourse. 
Children's Understanding of Spoken Discourse 
A number of experiments suggest that young children can 
construct mental models from spoken discourse. Their ability to 
integrate linguistic information with relevant knowledge is 
especially clear in a study by Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend, and 
Lawton (1977). In the second experiment of that study, second 
graders heard a narrative about a hunter of the fictitious Targa 
tribe. Although the story contained no information about 
weather, climate, or terrain, the children had heard a passage 
about the Targa a week before that described them as Eskimos 
living in a cold climate or as Indians living in a desert. In 
response to questions about weather and terrain, most of the 
subjects not only answered in accordance with the information 
acquired the week before but also said they were sure it was part 
of the story they had just heard. This suggests that they 
integrated the narrated content into a mental model incorporating 
prior knowledge. In other research children between the ages of 
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four and six have been found to understand the intentions of 
characters and causal relations among events (Stein & Glenn, 
1979) and to notice incongruities in stories violating schema-
based expectations about events, such as the theft of a bicycle 
or losing money (Stein & Trabasso, in press; Wimmer, 1979), even 
though these implications were not spelled out in the stories 
that they heard. 
Despite young children's ability to construct mental models 
from spoken discourse, there are apparent limitations on their 
performance. The second graders in the study by Brown et al. 
(1977) seemed to develop less elaborate representations than 
those of older children who performed the same tasks. Omanson, 
Warren, and Trabasso (1978) found that five-year-old children 
made many fewer inferences about the implicit content of stories 
than eight-year-olds did. Elementary school children in 
experiments by Markman (1977, 1979) regularly failed to detect 
omissions and inconsistencies in instructions and prose passages, 
leading Markman (1981) to suggest that they tended to treat the 
individual statements of texts as isolated units instead of 
constructing integrated representations. Other investigators 
have shown that children between the ages of five and seven often 
do not integrate the information in a passage well enough to 
recognize implied relationships accurately (Liben & Posnansky, 
1977; Moeser, 1976; Paris & Upton, 1976; Small & Butterworth, 
1981), even when the separate items needed to make the correct 
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inferences are available in memory (Collins, Wellman, Keniston, & 
Westby, 1978; Schmidt, Paris, & Stober, 1979). As a result, a 
young child who has heard a short descriptive passage, such as 
The bird is in the cage. The cage is under the table. The 
bird is yellow. 
may not integrate the sentences into a mental model carrying the 
information that the bird is also under the table (Small & 
Butterworth, 1981). 
Because these problems are most striking in preschool and 
young school-age children, they may be relevant to children's 
ability to understand text in the early stages of reading. 
However, the explanation for these problems is far from clear: 
There is no immediately obvious reason why children understand 
spoken discourse so well on some occasions and so poorly on 
others. We will discuss five possible sources of difficulty, 
each representing a different aspect of the construction of a 
mental model from spoken discourse, before we consider the 
further complications that written texts present. 
Knowledge. Young children lack some of the general 
knowledge that older children and adults possess (Chi, 1978). 
The importance of such knowlege in language comprehension and 
memory has been demonstrated repeatedly. For example, Bransford 
and Johnson (1973) report a study in which sentences like The 
notes were sour because the seam split were found to be hard to 
recall—unless they were preceded by a word, such as bagpipes, 
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that cued pertinent knowledge. In the experiment by Brown et al. 
(1977), children who had acquired relevant knowledge a week 
earlier remembered more of the story than children who had been 
given irrelevant information. Because of their inexperience and 
consequent lack of knowledge in many domains, younger children 
may construct relatively impoverished mental models, or fail to 
construct them at all. 
Types of mental models. Brewer (1980) has argued that 
different types of mental representations underlie texts from 
various genres. He proposed that descriptive discourse is 
represented by visual-spatial structures, narrative by plan and 
event structures, and expository text by abstract propositions or 
thoughts. Some of these representations may be easier to 
construct than others. Along these lines, several researchers 
have suggested that narratives are easier to understand than 
expository texts (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1982; Spiro & Taylor, 
in press). In the experiment by Markman (1979) cited earlier, 
elementary school children failed to notice inconsistencies in 
expository passages, although in other experiments much younger 
subjects were able to detect incongruities in narratives (Stein & 
Trabasso, in press; Wimmer, 1979). One possible explanation for 
this di sparity is that it is harder to form a mental model for 
the abstract logical structures that underlie expository texts 
than it is for the actions and events portrayed in narratives. 
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Global discourse organization. The information in a 
particular type of discourse is often organized in a 
characteristic way. For example, in folktales from the oral 
tradition, information about the characters, time, and location 
of the story ("Once upon a time in a land far away, there was a 
princess • • .") typically precedes the recounting of the events 
(Propp, 1968). Nonfictional spoken narratives commonly begin 
with setting information ("Last Thursday, Robbie was riding his 
bike on the street . . .") (Chafe, 1980). Oral narrations of 
events regularly follow the chronological order in which the 
events occurred, and the elements of spoken descriptions tend to 
conform to the order in which things are encountered in a spatial 
layout (Clark & Clark, 1968; Levelt, 1981; Linde & Labov, 1975; 
Osgood, 1971). 
Although many of these conventions appear to be very 
natural, alternative forms of organization are possible, and they 
are used. Certain of these alternatives have been found to 
disrupt younger children's language comprehension and memory. 
For example, Stein and Nezworski (cited by Baker & Stein, 1981) 
changed the order of mention of events in a narrative relative to 
the order of occurrence, marking the inversions in a way that 
indicated the deviation (for example, "Robbie broke his leg. It 
happened because he rode his bicycle into a parked car" instead 
of "Robbie rode his bicycle into a parked car. He broke his 
leg"). Although fifth graders recalled the information at least 
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as well when it was conveyed in marked inversions as when it 
was normally ordered, first graders recalled some types of 
information less well from narratives in the inverted format. It 
seems that discourse forms whose organization departs from the 
conventional structure or discourse forms whose conventions are 
unknown to children may impede comprehension, either because of 
their cognitive complexity or because children lack appropriate 
discourse knowledge. 
Using discourse cues. Children's difficulties with text 
integration may in some cases be traced to inefficient processing 
of anaphoric devices that mark repeated reference, such as 
pronouns. In an experiment by Tyler (1983), adults and five-, 
seven-, and ten-year-old children listened for mispronunciations 
of words in a spoken text. The mispronunciations were 
strategically located after pronouns or definite noun phrases 
that were coreferential with an expression in the preceding 
sentence, as in the following examples: 
Mother saw the postman coming from a distance. He_ brought a 
leffer from Uncle Charles who lives in Canada. 
Mother saw the postman coming from a distance. The postman 
brought a leffer from Uncle Charles, who lives in Canada. 
The referent of the italicized expressions should have been part 
of the listener's current model, making letter (mispronounced 
leffer) contextually predictable. However, five-year-olds were 
slower to detect the mispronounced word following the pronoun 
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than following the definite noun phrase, although adults and 
older children showed no differences between the two conditions. 
This suggests that the younger children had more difficulty 
accessing the referent of the pronoun from their representation 
of the content of the preceding sentence, which slowed their 
integration of the sentence into the developing mental model. 
Information integration. The final explanat ion that we will 
consider for disruptions in the formation of mental models is a 
general information-processing problem. Inferring relationships 
among the elements of a text demands that the relevant pieces of 
information (from the mental model, general knowledge, or 
immediate discourse) not only be stored in memory but also be 
actively in mind—held in working memory—at the time when the 
inference is to be made (Hayes-Roth & Thorndyke, 1979; Walker & 
Meyer, 1980). Children may be able to keep less information 
active in memory because of inefficient use of working memory 
capacity (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982), knowledge limitations 
(Chi, 1976), or diminished memory capacity (Pasc.ual-Leone, 1970). 
They may also neglect to retrieve and represent information in 
working memory when it is needed for integrating new material. A 
large body of evidence shows that children before roughly the age 
of seven do not spontaneously employ memory storage and retrieval 
strategies commonly used by older children and adults. Although 
younger children are able to use such strategies when instructed 
to do so, and although they benefit when they use them, they do 
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not invoke them without prompting (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & 
Campione, 1983). 
When measures are taken to alleviate memory-related 
problems, children's ability to draw inferences also improves 
dramatically: Four-year-olds have been found to infer unseen 
relationships among objects (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971) and 
unstated relationships among things mentioned in sentences 
(Harris & Basset, 1975) nearly as well as adults. However, 
without some form of external support for the active maintenance 
of appropriate information in memory, young children's inferences 
about relationships among the elements of spoken discourse may be 
restricted. 
Summary. We have suggested five aspects of the construction 
of mental models from discourse that represent possible problem 
areas in comprehension for preschool children—children who are 
about to begin learning to read. Thus far, however, we have 
focused on research concerning the understanding of spoken 
discourse. Because spoken and written language differ in 
substantial ways, the child confronted with a written text needs 
new solutions to some of the foregoing problems. In the next 
section, we consider the changes that occur in the transition 
from listening to reading. 
Spoken Versus Written Discourse 
Spoken and written discourse differ on a number of 
dimensions (Brewer, 1985; Chafe, 1982; Rubin, 1980; Snow, 1983; 
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Tannen, 1982). The dimensions that are most relevant for our 
purposes are interaction, contextualization, and transience. 
Interaction refers to the mutual determination of form, 
content, direction, and pace of communication by the participants 
in an exchange. Encounters between people using spoken language 
typically include a speaker and an addressee who can respond to 
one another, make comments, and ask questions, and who do so 
under the constraint of contributing fairly rapidly or risking 
the loss of a turn at speaking. In written language, the writer 
receives no immediate feedback, but is solely responsible for 
shaping the discourse and unbothered by interruptions from the 
intended audience. Contextualization involves the sharing of 
spatial and temporal contexts. Speakers and listeners are often 
in the same place at the same time, but writers and readers are 
not: Written messages are usually produced and understood in 
different contexts. Finally, speech signals are transient: They 
are generally available to the listener only briefly. Written 
language is relatively permanent. As a result, it can be read a 
number of times, and the reader can refer back to previous text 
when necessary. 
These and other, related dimensions create differences 
between spoken and written discourse that have implications for 
reading comprehension. We will discuss some of these differences 
in the context of the five facets of discourse comprehension 
introduced in the preceding section. 
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Knowledge. An oft noted advantage of the development of a 
writing system is that it allows the accumulated knowledge of a 
people to be passed from generation to generation in a form that 
is less subject to distortion and loss than oral transmission is. 
One obvious consequence of the accumulation of knowledge in print 
is that a wider range of topics and greater depth of coverage may 
be found in the books of an elementary school library than in 
day-to-day encounters with spoken language. Written discourse 
thus draws on and adds to a more diverse knowledge base than 
spoken discourse typically does. 
Some evidence that the possession of specialized knowledge 
can contribute to discourse comprehension comes from an 
experiment by Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss (1979). They 
compared the ability of subjects who varied in their knowledge of 
baseball to recall and answer questions about an account of a 
portion of a baseball game. High-knowledge subjects recalled 
more and answered more questions correctly, and proportionately 
more of the information that they remembered pertained to major 
points from the passage. In general, people with more knowledge 
about a subject may be better at relating new information to old 
because information from a familiar domain can be maintained in 
active memory more efficiently than unfamiliar information can 
(Chase & Simon, 1973). 
Types of mental models. Some types of discourse, including 
narrative, tend to occur in both spoken and written discourse. 
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Other types of discourse, such as exposition, are more commonly 
written than spoken. Certain written texts may thus require the 
creation of mental models that are both different and more 
difficult to construct than the models used to represent most 
spoken discourse. 
Whether it is the difficulty of constructing its underlying 
representation or some other factor, expository prose appears to 
slow down even skilled readers more than narrative does. 
Graesser, Hoffman & Clark (1980) found that college students read 
narrative passages faster than expository passages—on the order 
of 140 milliseconds per word faster—and that narrativity was by 
far the best predictor of variations in reading time in analyses 
that also examined effects of topic familiarity, number of words, 
syntactic complexity, number of propositions, and number of new 
referents introduced in the text. The significance of the 
problems created by expository prose can be appreciated by 
considering the amount of information that students are expected 
to learn by reading expository texts. 
Global discourse organization. The information conveyed in 
a discourse of a particular type may be organized in various 
ways. For example, rather than opening with a setting as oral 
narratives do, modern written stories tend to open with an event 
(O'Faolain, 1951). Setting information is instead woven into the 
text. Such variations in global discourse organization may play 
a larger role in writing than they do in speaking. The press of 
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time, limitations of memory, and the interruptions of 
interlocutors often constrain speakers' ability to organize a 
message. However, the author of a written text can organize and 
structure discourse over a longer period, even planning a 300-
page narrative in which the reader receives information that 
forces a complete revision of the mental model on the last page. 
With expository text, a writer can organize a complex set of 
logical relations in text form and use headings and other 
structural marking devices to delineate them (Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, 1982; Chafe, 1982). 
These and other differences between the usual circumstances 
and products of talking and writing may have increased the number 
of conventionalized global organizations in printed discourse. 
Brewer (1985) has claimed that written genres have a greater 
number of specialized text structures (newspaper articles, 
psychology journal articles, comic books, cookbooks, and so 
forth), each with its own conventions of content and form. 
Because different text organizations deal in different ways with 
the problem of presenting underlying cognitive structures in a 
sequential linguistic format, readers may benefit from a 
complementary inventory of comprehension strategies that are more 
varied than those used in listening. For example, because the 
pyramid style of newspaper writing summarizes important points 
before addressing the material in detail, readers who understand 
this organization can easily skim the material if they choose. 
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Using discourse cues. The absence of immediate 
conversational feedback and shared time and place requires 
written discourse to be more explicit than spoken. Chafe (1982) 
has provided evidence that writers pack more information into 
segments of text than speakers do. One of the important 
functions that this additional information serves is ensuring 
that readers correctly identify intended' referents in their 
mental models. When speakers and hearers share the same context, 
simple expressions suffice to indicate the topic of an utterance. 
In written language, more cues are needed: A speaker in a 
conversation might nod his head and say over there to convey the 
same information as the decontextualized The old man they had 
seen earlier walking his Saint Bernard came into view across the 
street. 
A related consequence of the contextualization of spoken 
language is that certain uses of pronouns and other referring 
expressions are more common in speech than they are in writing. 
The use of referring expressions to point out elements of the 
extralinguistic context is called deixis, while their use to 
indicate elements of a mental model that has been formed from a 
text is called anaphora. Someone watching a boy who has just 
hurled several objects at a wall might say to a companion, with 
no prelude, "What do you suppose he was doing?", where he is used 
deictically to indicate the boy. The same sentence in a written 
text with no introduction is cryptic. Instead, a referent is 
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usually established before the pronoun is used, as in "I saw a 
boy hurl several objects at a wall. What do you suppose he was 
doing?". Here, he_ is used anaphorically to indicate something 
that the reader or addressee should have in mind as a result of 
understanding the prior discourse. Although deixis is possible 
in writing, it is much more frequent in speech. 
Determining the referent of a deictic pronoun typically 
requires the identification of a salient element in the 
extralinguistic context or the current focus of attention. 
Understanding an anaphoric pronoun demands careful examination of 
the characteristics of the pronoun and its syntactic role in 
addition to an evaluation of the characteristics of candidate 
referents in the mental model. If readers attempt to understand 
anaphoric uses of pronouns in the same way that listeners 
understand deictic uses of pronouns, perhaps by picking out the 
most salient elements of their current mental model, they may be 
unsuccessful in determining the correct referents. There is some 
evidence that less-skilled readers approach anaphoric pronouns in 
this way. Frederiksen (1981) compared less-skilled and better 
high school readers' ability to recover the antecedents of 
pronouns, and found that the less-skilled readers relied more 
heavily on a salience strategy. This strategy involved falling 
back on the topic of the passage as the referent. As a result, 
less-skilled readers read sentences containing pronouns with 
nontopical antecedents more slowly, and they were less likely to 
I • 
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identify the antecedent correctly than they were when the 
pronouns had topical antecedents. Such a pattern suggests that 
Frederiksen1s less-skilled subjects may have dealt with pronouns 
in reading in a manner more appropriate to listening. 
There is an additional distinction among the ways in which 
pronouns are used that has potential implications for 
understanding discourse cues in written language. This is the 
contrast between deep and surface anaphora (Hankamer & Sag, 1976; 
Webber, 1980). Certain types or instances of anaphora require a 
representation of the actual language of an earlier sentence to 
be recovered in order to understand the reference, while others, 
like those we have been considering, refer directly to 
nonlinguistic elements in the c.omprehender1 s mental model of the 
text. Anaphora of the former type, called surface anaphora, is 
less acceptable when sentences intervene between the anaphor and 
its antecedent. Compare these two examples of surface anaphora 
from Tanenhaus, Carlson, and Seidenberg (1985): 
Somebody has to paint the garage. The paint is peeling and 
the wood is beginning to rot. Let's take a vote and see 
who. 
Somebody has to paint the garage. Let's take a vote and see 
who. 
It is more difficult to interpret who as who has to paint the 
garage in the first example than it is in the second, where there 
is no intervening sentence. A plausible explanation is that the 
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explicit linguistic representation of the initial sentence is no 
longer recoverable: After reading or hearing a sentence in 
discourse, readers and listeners have been shown to experience 
considerable difficulty in remembering the surface structure of 
prior sentences (Change, 1980; Jarvella, 1971). However, with 
deep anaphora, interruptions are less disruptive, since the 
reference is to a component of the mental model: 
Somebody has to paint the garage. The paint is peeling and 
the wood is beginning to rot. Let's take a vote and see who 
has to d£ it. 
If a reader is unable to remember the surface structure of a 
prior sentence, he or she can usually read it again. Listeners 
do not have this option. The transience of spoken language may 
thus lead speakers to use surface anaphora less often than 
writers do, creating another type of discourse reference for 
readers to master. 
Auditory and visual presentations of language have other 
subtle effects on discourse cues. Spoken English depends on 
intonation as a primary indicator of giveness and newness, with 
new information typically receiving higher stress than given 
information. Beyond such conventions as underlining for 
emphasis, written language possesses few means for indicating 
variations in intonation. Instead, skilled writers rely on 
syntax to mark distinctions between given and new information, 
placing new information later in sentences than the given 
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information to which it relates (Smith, 1971). Bolinger (1957) 
has claimed that this organization capitalizes on readers' 
generation of implicit intonation contours in which the highest 
stress is located near the ends of clauses. In listening, 
intonation seems to influence adults' cross-sentence integration, 
while syntactic variations that may be used to distinguish given 
and new information have little effect (Bock & Mazzella, 1983). 
In contrast, structural variations do influence integration in 
reading (Yekovich, Walker, & Blackman, 1978; also compare 
experiments 1 and 2 with experiment 3 in Ehrlich & Johnson-Laird, 
1982). These findings suggest that readers use syntax more 
heavily than listeners do for discourse cues, either for direct 
indicators of givenness or newness or for indirect cues mediated 
by implicit intonation. 
Information integration. Because it is easier to integrate 
material from separate sentences into a coherent mental model 
when the items of information to be related are simultaneously 
active in memory, condit ions that increase the probability of 
concurrent activation should enhance integration. For example, 
Walker and Meyer (1980) found that adult readers integrated text 
information more often when the separate components occurred 
consecutively than when they were separated in the text. 
However, only a subset of the information from a text will 
be readily accessible at any one time, because the amount of 
information from a discourse that can be activated simultaneously 
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is limited. Kintsch and van Dijk (1978) hypothesize that these 
limitations are reflected in the number of propositions from a 
text that can be maintained in working memory. We assume that 
the comprehender must interpret these propositions in terms of a 
mental model and that the process requires some part of the model 
to be maintained in working memory. (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 
discusses the differences between a mental model approach and 
that of Kintsch and van Dijk.) There are indications that 
reading comprehension skill correlates with the ability to relate 
linguistic information to a mental model. In an experiment by 
Merrill, Sperber, & McCauley (1981), less-skilled fifth-grade 
comprehenders appeared to have more difficulty relating 
information from sentences to a mental model than better 
comprehenders did. Nevertheless, the less-skilled comprehenders 
showed evidence of understanding the words in the sentences, as 
they would if they had developed only a superficial 
representation of the meaning (also see Oakhill, 1982). 
Since spoken language is more often related to the context 
in which it is understood than written language is, listeners' 
mental models are more likely than readers' to be supported by 
the extralinguistic context. The absence of external support in 
reading may increase the burden of maintaining currently 
important information in working memory. However, writing has an 
important advantage over speech in the provision of linguistic 
context: The text remains available. Thus, whenever the reader 
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realizes that previous information is needed, he or she can look 
back to recover the content, rather than having to retrieve it 
from memory. Print can therefore take over part of the function 
of working memory in integration, allowing the reader to recover 
antecedent information by retracing through the text. In an eye 
movement study by Carpenter and Just (1977), adult readers 
performed such regression very precisely, looking directly back 
to the place in the text where a potential antecedent occurred. 
This indicates that the use of prior text as a support for memory 
in the integration of information may be a well-developed ability 
in skilled reading. 
Implications for Learning to Read 
We have examined several differences between written and 
spoken discourse which suggest that the ability to develop mental 
models from spoken language does not fully or adequately support 
the comprehension of written texts. In this section we will 
elaborate some potential implications of this suggestion for the 
acquisition of reading, focusing again on the roles of the 
comprehender1s knowledge and the language of the text in the 
process of mental model construction. We assume in the following 
discussion that similarities between spoken and written discourse 
facilitate children's text comprehension, while differences 
create areas in which the beginning reader must acquire new 
knowledge and skills. 
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General know]edge and discourse knowledge. We suggested 
earlier that comprehending different types of texts requires the 
construction of different types of mental models. We hypothesize 
that children learning to read bring to the task a background of 
general knowledge and familiarity with spoken discourse 
structures that prepares them to construct some kinds of mental 
models more readily than others. 
Consider again the contrast between narrative and expository 
prose. The intuitive and empirically supported differences in 
the ease of understanding narratives and expositions may be due 
to the design of the human mind: Perhaps we are simply better 
equipped to deal with the kinds of information that narratives 
convey. Alternatively—or additionally—the knowledge of plans 
and events that underlies narratives, and the cognitive skill 
required in constructing mental models to represent them, may be 
better developed in most people than the knowledge and skills 
needed to construct mental models of expository prose. 
Differences in the availability of the cognitive resources 
needed to construct mental models for the comprehension of 
narratives and expositions may be particularly pronounced for 
young children. Children are likely to be acquainted with 
narratives and to know something about simple narrative 
structures because these structures are common in spoken 
discourse. Moreover, very young children possess implicit 
knowledge of causation and intention and their roles in real-
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world events (Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; Hood & Bloom, 1979; 
Nelson & Gruendel, 1981), knowledge that is critical for the 
interpretation of narrative texts. The explicit teaching of 
simple narrative forms may thus be unnecessary, at least as an 
adjunct to reading instruction. 
The situation for expository prose is different. The 
infrequency of exposition in spoken language makes such texts 
unfamiliar to inexperienced readers. The general knowledge of 
abstract argument structures needed to support the comprehension 
of expository discourse may be fragile in most young readers, and 
knowledge of appropriate global text structures nonexistent. 
Thus, there is little in the way of relevant prior knowledge to 
support reading comprehension. 
Although instructional effort with respect to discourse 
comprehension may be better centered on expository prose, 
narratives serve other purposes in the reading curriculum. 
Stories are a class of narrative designed to entertain, and they 
are frequently structured to produce enjoyment: The classic 
mystery story is not written to maximize comprehension but to 
heighten suspense and curiosity about omitted events. (For an 
analysis of the structure of stories in terms of the affective 
states that they evoke in readers, see Brewer & Lichtenstein, 
1981, 1982.) The motivational implications of this line -of 
reasoning must be considered when working out instructional 
programs. It has often been noted (see Gibson & Levin, 1975) 
. Discourse Structure and Mental Models 
30 
that, if a child is to read large amounts of text and become an 
independent reader, the material that the child receives should 
be interesting and entertaining, not just easily comprehended, 
(See Jose & Brewer, 1984, for research on factors influencing 
story liking in young children.) 
Discourse cues and local integration processes. The 
transfer from spoken to written discourse demands refinement and 
extension of the ability to integrate information from successive 
sentences in a text. However, memory deficits similar to those 
that limit preschoolers' and kindergartners' integration of 
spoken language also appear in novice readers. Johnson and 
Smith (1981) asked third and fifth graders to answer questions 
that required drawing inferences from passages they had read. 
The third graders were more successful when both premises 
required for the inferences were in the same paragraph, instead 
of in different paragraphs. This finding held even when the 
children were able to recall both premises in response to other 
questions, indicating that the necessary information was 
available somewhere in memory. Fifth graders were less 
influenced by separation of the premises in the text. Johnson 
and Smith (1981, p. 1221) suggest that older children 
strategically retrieve previous material, while younger children 
integrate items of information only when the current one "happens 
to 'call up' the first from long-term memory or when the two are 
temporally close and, thus, jointly present in working memory." 
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Alternatively, older children may be better at maintaining 
important information from previous text in working memory. 
If children are more successful in inferring relationships 
between elements of text and information in the mental model when 
that information is in working memory, maintenance or 
reinstatement of important material is crucial in the integration 
of new information. Adults spend more time reading important 
than unimportant information in narratives (Cirilo & Foss, 1980; 
Mandler & Goodman, 1982), and important information is more 
accessible in memory (Fletcher, 1981). Selecting what is 
important in order to maintain it actively in memory requires a 
degree of prior knowledge relevant to the content or structure of 
the discourse. In types of texts that are less familiar to young 
readers, such as exposition, active maintenance of central 
information may be hampered by difficulty in recognizing what is 
important. Less-experienced readers may thus need help in 
learning to identify the main points of expository prose and in 
learning how to maintain them efficiently in memory (for example, 
through summarization strategies; Brown & Day, 1983). 
Sometimes, however, the information needed to interpret and 
integrate information in text is not maintained and must be 
recovered from a less active state in memory. When adult readers 
encounter a reference to previously mentioned information, that 
information is commonly reinstated in working memory (Chang, 
1980; Dell, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1983; Frederiksen, 1981; Lesgold, 
• < 
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Roth, & Curtis, 1979; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1980). If necessary, 
the antecedent information may be inferred (Clark & Haviland, 
1977), and in some cases, the reader looks back to previous 
material to recover it (Carpenter & Just, 1977). Reinstatement 
requires engaging in activities appropriate for the 
identification and retrieval of information in the mental model 
but not in working memory. Beginning readers may be less likely 
to engage in such activities, because of the deficits in 
initiating strategic memory retrieval that are often seen in 
young children. 
Another important component of reinstatement is the explicit 
or implicit understanding that more information is needed for 
adequate comprehension. Such understanding includes the ability 
to recognize that none of the currently accessible information 
matches the specifications of expressions referring to given 
information. Some of the difficulties that this may create for 
young readers can be appreciated by reconsidering the distinction 
between deictic and anaphoric uses of pronouns. 
Deitic uses of pronouns predominate in the speech addressed 
to young children, where the topics of conversation center on the 
here-and-now rather than on events displaced in time or space. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1981) has argued that five- and six-year-old 
children's use of pronouns is fundamentally deictic, with 
pronouns taken as pointers to salient elements in the 
extralinguistic context, not as indicators of coreference with 
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particular previously mentioned entities, that is, not as 
anaphors. If the anaphoric function of pronouns is relatively 
unfamiliar to beginning readers—and Tyler's (1983) work suggests 
this is a reasonable assumption—they may fail to realize that a 
pronoun does not refer to any of the information that is readily 
accessible• 
Evidence that lack of skill in processing anaphora can 
affect text integration in young readers has been reported by 
Garnham, Oakhill, & Johnson-Laird (1982). Their seven- and 
eight-year-old subjects fell into two groups matched for age, 
word recognition, and sight vocabulary but differing in 
comprehension ability. Each child read one of three versions of 
a passage that varied in plausibility and coherence. The 
plausible version described a normal sequence of events involving 
a young boy playing with a ball, while the other two versions 
contained an implausible sequence. These implausible versions 
differed in the degree to which pronouns in the passage could be 
linked to antecedents within the text. The coherent implausible 
version was written so that appropriate antecedents for the 
pronouns could be readily inferred, despite the absence of a 
normal event sequence, while the incoherent implausible version 
was written so that it was difficult to locate antecedents. On a 
subsequent test, the skilled comprehenders did not differ from 
the less-skilled comprehenders in recall of the basic ideas from 
the implausible incoherent passage, but they were significantly 
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better on both coherent passages. The less-skilled comprehenders 
did no better on the coherent implausible version than they did 
on the incoherent implausible version, although their performance 
improved on the plausible passage. 
Such findings strongly suggest that younger and less-skilled 
readers may not deal efficiently with pronominalization in text. 
Yet a major source of potential guidance in learning to 
understand anaphora appears to contribute very little to 
resolving the trouble: Basal reading materials and teaching 
manuals rarely offer instruction in handling anaphoric relations 
(Johnson & Barrett, 1981). 
Some less-skilled comprehenders may experience enduring 
problems with the interpretation of anaphoric relationships and 
other components of the local, sentence-to-sentence integration 
process. Vipond (1980) found that variability in performance 
among less-skilled college readers who read and recalled 
technical passages could be attributed primarily to the 
difficulty of such local processes (see also Graesser et al., 
1980). The ability to integrate information across consecutive 
sentences in written discourse thus appears to be correlated with 
reading success. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of the problems of discourse comprehension 
faced by beginning readers has touched on three broad themes that 
bear a brief summary. These three themes are the general nature 
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of text comprehension, the discourse comprehension ability of 
preschool children, and differences between spoken and written 
discourse• 
With respect to the general nature of text comprehension, we 
argued that the fundamental process is the construction of a 
mental model that captures the content of the text in a unified 
representation. Mental models are shaped in part by processes 
operating on the global structures and local language of texts to 
integrate new information appropriately. But, equally important, 
model construction draws on the comprehender1s knowledge of such 
basic categories as human intention, causality, space, time, and 
logical relations, as well as of such prosaic matters as first 
bike rides. 
With respect to early discourse comprehension, we suggested 
that, before children learn to read, they are capable of forming 
mental models from the texts that they hear. However, their 
ability is limited, perhaps by such factors as restricted general 
knowledge, inexperience in constructing certain types of mental 
models, unfamiliarity with various global text structures, 
difficulty in understanding anaphoric expressions, and deficits 
in the use of memory. 
Finally, differences between written texts and the spoken 
discourse which children have mastered when they begin school 
have the potential to exacerbate their comprehension problems. 
Spoken discourse taps a narrower range of knowledge, it is 
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structured in different ways, it uses different anaphoric 
devices, and it provides more contextual support for its 
interpretation than written texts do. The transfer of discourse 
competence to reading should be easiest for texts such as 
narratives that are common in both speech and writing, and that 
rest on knowledge that young children firmly possess. The major 
hurdle 
in the acquisition of discourse comprehension skills may 
be expository prose. Since most of the knowledge that students 
are expected to acquire in school is conveyed in that format, 
facility in dealing with expository discourse represents a 
crucial step in the development of text understanding. 
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